Beyond Nation States: New Perspectives on the Habsburg Empire by Körner, A
 1 
Beyond Nation States: New Perspectives on the Habsburg Empire1 
 
Axel Körner 
University College London, UK 
 
Abstract: Starting from a discussion of three new books, the article examines recent 
developments in Habsburg historiography, which have important implications for the 
ways historians explain nineteenth-century European history as a whole, and the 
Empire's relationship to its many nationalities in particular. Wolfram Siemann’s 
monumental new biography of Metternich makes a crucial contribution to reassess the 
historical context from which the Habsburg monarchy emerged. At the centre of this 
work is the statesman’s political thought and his dramatic experience of political 
change between the French Revolution and the aftermath of 1848. Pieter Judson’s 
history of the Habsburg monarchy exemplifies a substantial new body of research that 
has shifted attention from the antagonistic relationship between the Empire and its 
nationalities to the compatibility between a sense of national belonging and imperial 
loyalty. Both works complement the discussion of hybridity and national indifference 
during Emperor Franz Joseph’s long reign, which Michaela and Karl Vocelka 
examine in a new biography. 
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Since the fifteenth century the Habsburgs had provided the Holy Roman Empire with 
Emperors, but before 1804 their European possessions never constituted an Empire in 
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its own right.2 The Kaisertum Österreich emerged as an administrative structure for 
their territories after the Holy Roman Empire had become defunct as a consequence 
of the Napoleonic Wars. In 1806 the last Roman Emperor Franz II dissolved the Old 
Reich, but continued to rule as head of his new Empire, using the name Franz I. Over 
the following decades the Empire’s constitutional development had to take account of 
the rights and privileges of its different territories, as well as of its peoples’ more 
recent sense of national belonging, including the particular challenges arising from 
the Habsburgs’ association with the lands of the Hungarian and Bohemian crowns. At 
no point the Empire’s internal borders overlapped with those of its nationalities’ areas 
of settlement; and most nationalities did not live in compact units, but were spread 
across the monarchy’s different parts. For over a hundred years the Habsburg 
monarchy held this complex system in balance. Too often its history has been written 
as one of ‘decline and fall’, where what we know about the Empire’s demise in the 
wake of World War One has determined the historiographical agenda. In this 
teleological perspective the Habsburg monarchy’s national diversity has usually been 
seen as its principal weakness. As a ‘prison of nationalities’ the monarchy was 
doomed to fall, or similar the cliché goes. 
While it would be difficult to talk away the Empire’s challenge of nationalism, 
or the growing tension between its peoples, much of this argument is still based on the 
assumption that modern societies have to be organised on the basis of ethnic 
belonging, and that nation states represent an almost inevitable step of historical 
development. Consequently, the Habsburg Empire was demoted to a relic of the past 
(despite the fact that it was actually a modern invention), an obstacle to the timely 
organisation of Central Europe in form of independent nation states. The revival of 
studies on modern nationalism since the 1980s, invigorated by contemporary political 
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change, is partly responsible for reducing much of nineteenth-century history to an 
age of emerging nation states. While a rich historiography contributed enormously to 
our understanding of modern nationalism, it encouraged historians to ignore the 
alternatives to national states that were also discussed in nineteenth-century political 
thought. Studies of national conflict were privileged over more peaceful exchanges 
between national groups. Much of the historiography read almost any aspect of 
nineteenth-century political, cultural or economic life as the articulation of a national 
sense of belonging.  
Contemporary awareness of problems resulting from nationalism, as well as 
the rise of transnational history and of new approaches to the history of political 
thought, have contributed to a change of agenda in research on nineteenth-century 
Europe. Cultural and intellectual history, with their focus on ideas, their reception and 
lived experiences, have complicated approaches informed predominantly by social 
theory, making it more difficult to present history as the sole result of single processes 
such as national identity formation. On the back of these multiple new trends in 
historiography, a fascinating range of recent works on Habsburg history, many of 
them coming from across the Atlantic, have called into question the conventional 
view of the Habsburg Empire as one of constant conflict between nationalities. An 
influential early example of this reassessment has been István Deák’s book on the 
Habsburg officer corps, followed more recently by Laurence Cole’s book on Austrian 
military culture.3 But the army was not the only institution where the Empire’s 
nationalities met. Along with a wealth of articles in specialised periodicals, 
contributions to this reassessment include monographs by Monika Báar, John Deak 
and Benno Gammerl.4 Eagle Glassheim, Jeremy King, Dominique Kirchner Reill, 
Rita Krueger and Tara Zahra, to quote only a selection of authors writing in English, 
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studied particular regions or nationality groups within the Empire.5 Pioneering were 
the works by Pieter Judson, one of the authors discussed in what follows.6 All 
published within just over a decade, these studies have shown that a dominating sense 
of national belonging was not a given among the Empire’s populations, and that 
adherence to one nation often involved difficult choices, in particular in ethnically 
mixed areas. Many recent works underline the hybridity of national identity, as well 
as constant exchanges between nationality groups, which were not always 
conflictual.7 In the wake of these new studies also the myths concerning the Empire’s 
successor states have been partly dismantled.8  
The many specialised studies on individual regions, on particular social or 
national groups, require a fresh synthesis of Habsburg history, which Pieter Judson 
has produced with great skill: a narrative that reflects decades of research on Central 
Europe.9 Meanwhile, the new historiography on the Empire’s nationalities also 
challenges established views of its main protagonists. In the case of Metternich, one 
of the principal architects of the Empire and its relationship to Europe, the assessment 
by historians of nationalism has usually been outright negative, without that their 
judgement has engaged in any meaningful way with the political thought that 
informed his decisions as a diplomat and statesman.10 While many historians of 
nationalism are critical of some aspects of nationalist ideology, they often share the 
main idea informing these movements’ policies, that nation states are per se a good 
thing and that their establishment counts as a sign of societal progress. If the new 
historiography on the Empire’s nationalities no longer shares this view, Metternich’s 
role has to be revisited. Wolfram Siemann has written the biography that provides us 
with the much needed revision of the ideas on which many of the previous 
evaluations of the Empire’s role in Europe have been based: a massive book that 
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nevertheless reads extremely well and promises to last longer than anything that has 
been written on Metternich over the past one hundred fifty years.11 Another of the 
Empire’s protagonists has had overall a slightly better press, if probably for the wrong 
reasons. Monarchical nostalgia and popular culture, combined with a 
historiographical agenda that rendered biographies of any monarchs suspect, have 
protected Emperor Franz Joseph from taking too much of the blame usually directed 
against the Empire. This is surprising considering that during his long reign much of 
the Empire’s executive power was concentrated in his hands. Michaela and Karl 
Vocelka have written a very readable book on which future historians will be able to 
draw for the biographical background other histories of the Empire have left aside.12 
Although their book relates only indirectly to the nationality issues recent histories of 
the monarchy have revised, their study makes a welcome contribution to the current 
interest in the cultural representation and the social function of monarchy.13 In the 
following this article will discuss all three works in roughly chronological order, 
keeping the focus on the relationship between the Empire’s nationalities, while also 
referencing other recent titles on the Empire.  
Siemann’s Metternich is a monument to scholarship, a Jahrhundert-
Biographie, not only because it convincingly challenges our view of the statesman, 
and therefore of nineteenth-century Europe as a whole, but also because it represents 
the model of a scholarly biography against which future works will be measured.14 It 
is well-written, showing empathy for its main character without becoming uncritical; 
the product of thorough research in many previously overlooked archives; and based 
on an exhaustive engagement with the wider historical context. Any work of historical 
scholarship can easily be amplified by additional archival work. The same is true for 
Siemann, simply because every national archive in Europe contains files relating to 
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Metternich, from state papers and diplomatic notes to the personal files of people who 
had met Metternich or wrote about him. While any serious work on Metternich would 
use materials from the Viennese Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, and the 
Verwaltungsarchiv, Siemann’s most remarkable archival achievement is the inclusion 
of numerous Czech collections, which are richer and at the same time more difficult 
to use than for instance the French, British and Italian archives Siemann did not 
explore. 
Siemann describes Metternich’s upbringing as a cosmopolitan world that 
engaged eagerly with the ideas of the Enlightenment. The French Revolution 
destroyed this world, replacing the old order with nationalism, intolerance and 
fanaticism, and with a level of bloodshed Europe had not seen since the 30-Years-
War. Although German universities tend to have no dedicated chairs in intellectual 
history, Siemann demonstrates how fruitful this approach can be to explain 
Metternich’s political actions. Throughout his work he analyses what Metternich has 
read, from newspapers and pamphlets to academic works, and uses this information to 
examine in what sense his ideas responded to different authors. He also employs 
conceptual history to show how Europe’s social and political language changed 
during the long years of Metternich’s involvement in politics: A brilliant example of 
this approach is his analysis of the term Policey (778).  
For Metternich relations between states had to be based on mutual respect of 
international law, a lesson he learned from Christoph Wilhelm Koch, with whom he 
studied at Strasbourg, the same teacher that influenced Constant, Goethe and 
Montgelas. Niklas Vogt in Mainz introduced Metternich to the mixed constitution of 
the Holy Roman Empire, a system that protected Europe from hegemonic power. 
Metternich, who in 1809 became Austrian foreign minister, considered Napoleon’s 
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defeat the only way to re-establish order in Europe. As Siemann points out, 
Metternich spoke of ‘Rekonstruktion’ not of ‘Restauration’ (78). Instead of ‘restoring’ 
ruins of what no longer was, Metternich wished to ‘reconstruct’ a system of 
international relations from scratch. He put the emphasis on a ‘security policy’, which 
was aimed at defending the Vienna system of international law from a return to 
revolutionary turmoil, while at the same time establishing the constitutional 
governments the Congress had failed to deliver. Siemann is the first biographer to 
have studied in detail the first of Metternich’s three trips to England, in 1794, where 
he appreciated the country’s constitutional institutions and turned into what Siemann 
describes as a ‘conservative Whig’ (155). Many years later, in 1819, Metternich 
confessed that he would have liked to be born an Englishman. Meanwhile, he insisted 
that constitutions had to be rooted in historical circumstances. It was for this reason 
that he opposed constitutions emerging from revolutions, or the implementation of 
foreign models in countries that had their own social, economic and political histories. 
His argument shows surprising parallels to the ideas discussed at the time by de 
Tocqueville, or the Italian political thinkers Romagnosi and Cattaneo.15 
With regard to previous biographies Siemann dismisses early on the 
influential work by Austrian historian Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, a cultural imperialist, 
who had denounced Metternich for his lack of volkish instinct. Much of Siemann’s 
Metternich seems to be written to prove Srbik wrong, and it does so successfully. 
Siemann combines a chronological journey of almost 1000 pages through 
Metternich’s life with four thematic chapters on war, women, the economy and 
governance. In many respects the most revealing of these four chapters is the one on 
war. It is a tribute to what the emotional turn is able to add to historical-political 
analysis. Siemann shows us a statesman who hated almost every aspect of modern 
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warfare. He was disgusted by its effects on humanity and remained traumatised by his 
experience of battlefields, the brutal suffering of young soldiers and civilians, the 
raping, the looting and all other forms of human degradation associated with the 
enormity of the Napoleonic wars. Metternich revealed these feelings almost 
exclusively in his private correspondence with family and lovers, but they become an 
important source of understanding for the intentions that informed his design of a 
post-Napoleonic order.  
An important key to Metternich’s life is his family’s legacy in the Rhinelands 
and in the service of the Holy Roman Empire, which is what first brought him into 
contact with the Habsburgs. Bohemia, Vienna and the later Austrian Empire became 
the geographical centre of Metternich’s life only at the end of 1794, when the 
Metternichs had lost all of their possessions west of the Rhine to the French. 
According to Siemann’s account, it is during the collapse of the Third Coalition that 
Metternich became a true European, when he accepted that the Holy Roman Empire 
could not be saved and had to be replaced by a new concept of Europe based on 
international law. This political vision grew out of his observation of Prussia’s 
disastrous policy of neutrality and its subsequent arrangements with Napoleon, for 
which it paid the prize at Jena and Auerstedt. Siemann rewrites the history of 1813 by 
arguing for Metternich’s leading role in turning this page of European history. Rather 
than opportunism, a long-term strategy to preserve Austria informed Metternich’s 
approach to the changing military circumstances that finally led to the alliance against 
Napoleon. As early as May 1813 Metternich presented to Czar Alexander and the 
Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm III the principles that would inform the Vienna 
agreement of 1815. Siemann rejects Paul Schroeder’s view that it was Castlereagh 
who gave the alliance of 1813 coherence by spelling out the war aims and Germany’s 
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future federalist order.16 According to Siemann this framework was born earlier at 
Teplitz, in September 1813, before Britain joined the alliance. While much of the 
historiography still argues that Metternich, early in 1814, still tried to reach peace 
with Napoleon, Siemann demonstrates that from January 1814 his aim was to force 
Napoleon to abdicate and to push France back into its borders of 1789. That the 
coalition did not break had much to do with Metternich’s negotiating talent. In June 
1814 Metternich departed for his second extended trip to England. A royal frigate 
under the command of the Duke of Clarence, son of George III, welcomed him in 
Boulogne; in London the masses greeted his carriage with a heartfelt ‘Hurray Prince 
Metternich forever’ (467). During the same visit the University of Oxford, in presence 
of the prince regent, Czar Alexander, the Prussian King, Wellington and Blücher, 
made Metternich a doctor honoris causae.  
For the new historiography on the monarchy’s nationality question the 
negotiations at Vienna are particularly interesting. Metternich always saw the 
partition of Poland as a violation of international law and supported the idea of its 
independence in the borders of 1772 as an element of equilibrium between Russia, 
Prussia and Austria, although it is unclear what solution he envisaged for Galicia’s 
substantial Ruthenian and Jewish populations. Congress Poland, the Russian 
dominated Kingdom of Poland created at the Congress of Vienna, only emerged as a 
compromise to block the extreme territorial demands of Prussia and Russia. 
Metternich opposed Alexander’s idea of forming the Holy Alliance, created in 
Metternich’s words to ‘hold down the rights of peoples, to promote absolutism and 
tyranny’ (521). Behind Siemann’s analysis we see a statesman who supported the 
rights of nations within states, a concept the author compares to the Swiss constitution 
and the European Union, as opposed to ethnically homogenous nation states, which 
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he rightly considered inapplicable to most of Europe. Siemann presents plentiful 
evidence for this view. When in 1828 Metternich created a Mausoleum for his family 
on his Bohemian estate in Plaß/Plasy, he had the documents printed in German and 
Czech, at a time when the Czech revival was still in its infancy. At the Universities of 
Laibach/Ljubljana, Prague and Brünn/Brno he supported the creation of chairs in 
Slavonic languages. The University in Lemberg/Lviv should teach in Polish. If Srbik 
described Metternich’s thinking as ‘unnational’, Siemann uses the example of the 
Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom to prove the opposite. His declared aim was the 
provinces’ autonomy and self-rule within the monarchy, symbolised by judicial 
independence and the establishment of a Milanese court, comparing the city’s rank in 
the Empire to that of regional capitals like Brünn/Brno or Graz. All Austrian civil 
servants based there had to speak Italian. For these reasons Metternich frequently 
found himself in conflict with Germanizing tendencies among the Austrian 
administration. He had no difficulty seeing Italy as a unity in cultural terms and 
supported the promotion of Italian language and literature across the peninsula. He 
compared the Italian nation to Germany: united in its historically grown political 
diversity. What he aimed for was the creation of a ‘Lega Italica’, a league of Italian 
states comparable to the German Confederation (615). With this in mind he promoted 
the development of an inter-Italian infrastructure, the regulation of customs between 
the states and improved postal services. He explicitly encouraged the mobility of 
Milanese students to allow them periods of study in Florence or Parma. Soft 
diplomacy meant imperial visits, public education, the promotion of Rossini all over 
the Empire (an aspect he does not consider). Relations with the Hungarian magnates 
proved more complicated, but still in the 1840s he developed a programme for 
Hungary’s economic improvement, based on the ideas of Friedrich List. Choosing 
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Countess Zichy-Ferraris as his third wife, Metternich married into one of Hungary’s 
most influential noble families, a source of great support for his policies.  
Highly instructive sections of Siemann’s book deal with Metternich’s role as 
administrator of his estates and innovative industrialist, and as a generous benefactor 
to his subjects. Metternich’s rule is frequently associated with the monarchy’s alleged 
backwardness in economic matters, where internal duties are listed among the barriers 
to modernisation. Siemann shows that in the 1830s it was Metternich who wanted to 
reduce tariffs, partly in response to economic integration within the German 
Confederation. Agrarian interests and the influence on economic policy of Bohemian 
lobbyists around Count Kolowrat blocked these initiatives. Also for the repression of 
democratic and revolutionary movements Metternich conventionally has to take most 
of the blame, although supposedly more liberal or progressive regimes like England 
and Piedmont resorted to very much the same measures in order to prevent Europe 
from falling back into turmoil. Siemann explains the emerging social question as 
closely related to the financial consequences of the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon’s 
policies of eliminating economic resources in occupied territories, combined with 
gigantic levels of debt accumulated to finance the war effort, put public investment or 
any form of financial support for underdeveloped regions to a halt. For decades after 
the Congress of Vienna public debt exceeded national income, while the masses 
continued to live below the poverty line. Once villages had been destroyed, horse-
craft and cattle confiscated, and the male labour force reduced by conscription, it took 
several generations to make up for the loss, a development that simply could not be 
balanced out by industrialisation. The result was mounting political and social 
discontent. According to Siemann most European states took until the mid 1840s to 
reach fiscal consolidation. His argument does not account for the social dynamic set 
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free by the emerging forms of industrial capitalism – to which Napoleon had 
contributed by liberalising trade, and transforming land and labour into commodities 
– but it explains why states lacked the resources to respond to the social question and 
why, at the same time, they so much feared democratic agitation. 
On many occasions Siemann’s reading of Metternich suggests that important 
chapters of European history have been written on the basis of ideologically 
motivated myths. At the Troppau conference of 1820, called to find a response to the 
revolution in Naples, Metternich encouraged Ferdinand I to introduce reforms and 
hesitated over foreign intervention, which Britain supported. During the conference at 
Laibach, the following year, revolution broke out in Piedmont-Sardinia, which called 
for Austrian help. France was the driving force behind intervention in Spain, again 
against Metternich’s advice. Also in 1830 Metternich was among the few voices 
opting against an intervention in France. Louis Philippe’s foreign policy decisions 
proved him right. Unfortunately, Siemann tells us little about Metternich’s position 
towards the Italian states in 1830. While in recent years the history of the 
Risorgimento has received numerous new impulses, Habsburg history still largely 
overlooks the role of the Empire’s Italian speakers.17  
Metternich’s last decade in office was marked by a sense of frustration over 
his inability to reform the Empire. After the Congress of Vienna it had been Franz I 
who lacked the vision to take up Metternich’s plans for the Empire’s reorganisation. 
Under Ferdinand, intrigues at Court and Kolowrat’s sudden increase in power were to 
blame. Declining health deprived Metternich of the energy to hold against these 
forces. He was convinced that the events of 1848 were the direct consequence of the 
administration’s failures during those years. From his exile in London Metternich 
wrote to Archduke Johann that in ‘the future state no nationality shall be allowed to 
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stand above any other’ (841). As Siemann points out, this view had much in common 
with the ideas of the Czech national leader František Palacký and his opposition to the 
policies of the Frankfurt parliament.  
Sympathy with the main character certainly counts for some of Siemann’s 
arguments. But it will require careful archival work to dismiss his revision of 
Metternich’s image. It is regrettable that Siemann’s publisher did not allow for a more 
complete set of notes, leaving many quotations from original documents without 
reference. Given that his work addresses a predominantly academic readership – 
several years ago Siemann already wrote a slim biography directed at a more general 
audience – this decision seems difficult to justify.18 A number of avoidable factual 
mistakes slipped into the narrative, for instance when the ‘invention of tradition’ is 
attributed to E. P. Thompson (259); and peer reviewers should have spotted that 
Thompson was not American, but British (627). Siemann illustrates his account of 
Tyrol’s spectacular 1809-uprising with the famous Andreas-Hofer-Lied, but its text 
dates from 1831 and the tune of 1844, when nationalism had started to play a rather 
different role. 
Metternich’s long period at the forefront of Austrian and European politics 
ended shortly before Franz Joseph I became Emperor, but was marked by elements of 
biographical continuity that sometimes go unnoticed. After 1835, when Metternich’s 
influence in Austrian politics diminished, the Staatskanzler remained in close contact 
with Archduchess Sophie, mother of Franz Joseph, whose education Metternich 
oversaw, including weekly lectures on the art of politics. Metternich’s own children 
belonged to the inner circle of the future Emperor. While biographies of Franz II/I and 
Ferdinand I are still difficult to find, plenty of biographical material is available on the 
penultimate Emperor, from edited primary sources and contemporary accounts of his 
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life to a number of more recent publications. Published in time for the one-hundredth 
anniversary of Franz Joseph’s death, the biography by Michaela and Karl Vocelka 
distinguishes itself from earlier works by its excellent command of the academic 
literature and extensive use of published and unpublished primary sources.19 Even 
more than in the case of Siemann, the authors face the particular difficulty of having 
to disentangle history, myth and memory, the latter having become a field of 
Habsburg scholarship in its own right.20 The Vocelkas present a ruler at odds with 
modern times. They charge Metternich with a great deal of responsibility for Franz 
Joseph’s reactionary political views; and here their assessment contrasts considerably 
with Siemann’s more sympathetic account.  
If re-evaluations of the Empire’s nationality question constitute an important 
element of recent historiography, there are a number of aspects in Franz Joseph’s 
early biography that feed into this discussion. Since the very first days of his 
upbringing Franz Joseph was used to linguistic diversity, including French, Czech and 
Hungarian. Teaching was formalised with the help of professionally trained native 
speakers from his sixth year, adding to those languages Italian, Latin and classical 
Greek. His Hungarian readings included the writings of the liberal reformers István 
Széchenyi and József Eötvös. An explicitly modern aspect of the future emperor’s 
education was his instruction in natural sciences, presenting an important basis for his 
later interest in the Empire’s diverse economic resources. A basic instruction in 
engineering and a strong emphasis on modern military sciences complemented his 
curriculum.  
The Revolutions of 1848 brought Franz Joseph’s accession to the throne. The 
Vocelkas emphasise the role of the events in Paris (57), where the beginning of the 
Revolution in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, several weeks earlier, would have had 
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a more direct impact on the Habsburg Empire: For decades Europe had seen the 
Italian South as Austria’s direct backwater; and it was here where the post-
Napoleonic order started to collapse. The events in Milan and Venice followed suite. 
Equally dangerous for the monarchy was the unfolding German Question. 
Referencing recent studies on the Holy Roman Empire, Siemann demonstrated how 
Metternich had been aware of the role of symbolic representation.21 Franz Joseph, 
however, decided to forego coronations in Prague and Milan, which still had been 
central to the accession of Ferdinand I. As an occasion for staging legitimacy, 
particularly in Bohemia they would have helped to reconcile both German and Czech 
speakers with the reigning dynasty. As the Vocelkas point out, the fact that the 
crownlands were not inhabited by single nationalities made it necessary to articulate 
legitimacy. In addition to being a political mistake, the authors underline how 
Hungary’s forced integration into the Austrian administration was problematic from a 
legal point of view. After Hungary’s defeat and occupation in August 1849, 
reconciliation with the monarchy became almost impossible even for anti-
revolutionary Hungarians. In the Austrian part of the monarchy the revocation of the 
March Constitution in 1851 and its replacement with the Silvesterpatent likewise 
alienated even moderate forces. Despite these backlashes, almost everywhere 
Habsburg rule continued to have supporters. In their assessment of dynastic loyalty 
the authors underestimate the extent to which especially in Bohemia, but also among 
Hungary’s Slavonic speaking majority, a multinational Empire was seen as the only 
political future that granted them cultural survival in an age of emerging nation states. 
Many people either believed in dynastic legitimacy or simply feared the turmoil 
associated with revolution. Also the Church continued to bind wide sections of the 
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population to the monarchy, a function that was reflected in the concordat that Franz 
Joseph and Pius IX concluded in 1855.  
Another event marking Franz Joseph’s early reign had been the forced 
retirement in April 1849 of Field-Marshal Alfred von Windisch-Graetz, who was 
hated by many nationalists. To a good deal Franz Joseph owed him his accession to 
the throne. The void he left was filled by a prominent Bohemian aristocrat, Prince 
Felix von Scharzenberg, who became Prime Minister and compared to Windisch-
Graetz had a more liberal attitude towards public opinion. The Emperor himself 
started playing an important role in the administration. It was through hard work 
during those early years that he developed his excellent understanding of state 
bureaucracy. Any historian who has worked in Vienna’s Verwaltungsarchiv will have 
been impressed by the mass and detail of the Emperor’s annotations on almost all 
levels of the administration. It therefore seems surprising that during the Empire’s 
constitutional development up to 1865 Franz Joseph often comes across as driven by 
changes he no longer controlled. This only changed after 1866, when he became ‘the 
constitutional monarch he never wanted to be’ (178). 
The authors analyse in detail the traumatic experience of territorial losses in 
1859. For the Habsburgs and much of public opinion these events constituted a 
violation of the principles of international law established at the Congress of Vienna. 
Not so much the victory of nationalism but the territorial expansion of some states (in 
this case Piedmont-Sardinia and France) at the expense of others contradicted the 
Emperor’s understanding of princely honour. Prussia’s recognition of Italian 
Unification and the two countries’ military alliance of 1866 further hurt his feelings. 
In the summer of 1863 the Emperor had attempted resolve the German question 
through a convention of the German princes. He had travelled to Gastein to discuss 
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the idea with Wilhelm I, who refused: another affront to the waning prestige of the 
Habsburgs within the Confederation. The subsequent war of 1866, which cost Austria 
the lives of 44,000 soldiers and the loss of Venetia, sealed the country’s constitutional 
relationship to the German states. The number of the monarchy’s Italians, once the 
third largest population group, was suddenly reduced to just 700,000. 
In 1867 Franz Joseph granted Hungary the recognition and some of the rights 
it had lost in 1849. The Compromise reflected a complicated process of 
rapprochement that had started during the mid 1850s, promoted throughout by 
Empress Elizabeth, culminating in the constitution of the Hungarian diet in 1865. To a 
large extent the Compromise was based on the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713, which 
made it acceptable to the Emperor as well as to the Magyars, despite the fact that 
considerable sections of the court rejected his policies towards Hungary. The authors 
tell us little about the reactions to the Compromise among Hungary’s Slavonic 
speaking majority. The new Hungarian Prime Minister Count Gyula Andrássy 
rejected any attempts on behalf of the Emperor to consider their position. In much 
detail the book analyses the symbolism behind Franz Joseph’s coronation, staged by 
the magnates according to neo-medieval rituals. The Emperor received the Hungarian 
crown from Andrássy, the same man he had sentenced to death in 1849. The pompous 
events and the response they received suggest both the acceptance of the new political 
facts by the Hungarian establishment as well as their distance to larger sections of the 
population, who continued to honour Kossuth’s more radical position. During the 
ceremonies the Hungarian middle classes remained in the background, peasants and 
Slavs played no role at all, contrary to imperial rituals in other parts of the monarchy. 
The year 1867 also brought an end to Austria’s period of neo-absolutist rule. It 
was a development that contradicted many of the Emperor’s political principles, but 
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he nevertheless felt bound to the set of laws that became Austria’s constitution up to 
World War I. Against explicit papal advice he signed the religious laws of 1868, 
representing an important step towards the separation of church and state. The Empire 
was now divided into two largely autonomous parts, Cisleithania, which was 
dominated by 6 million German speakers, and Transleithania, where 5 Million 
Magyars continued to enjoy their privileged status. The Empire’s remaining 
population of 18 million Slavs, where Czechs, Poles and Croatians formed the largest 
groups, gained civic and political rights, but their situation as national constituencies 
hardly changed. While in 1848 many of them had seen the Emperor as guarantor of 
their national rights, they now remained disillusioned. In Hungary Magyarisation 
became official state doctrine. Hungary enjoyed privileges that were denied to the 
lands of the Bohemian crown, despite their loyal support in 1848. Dualism destroyed 
much of the basis of Bohemia’s dynastic allegiance, while also turning Czechs against 
Germans. The authors list many attempts on behalf of the Emperor to come to an 
agreement with Bohemia, but he persistently lacked the courage to confront German 
and Hungarian opposition to Trialism. 
Long sections of the book read like a general political history of the monarchy 
under Franz Joseph, without much detail on the Emperor’s personal role, his views or 
his daily work. Exceptions are sections on his relationship to the Empress and to his 
lovers, as well as on his travels and his passion for hunting. Here the reader 
encounters many of the familiar anecdotes about the Emperor’s private life without 
that additional documents or the critical reading of previously known sources reveal 
new insights. Perhaps it is impossible to write a history of the Emperor’s life, or of his 
political thought, while an analysis of his political and administrative role would 
require an almost endless analysis of his daily interventions in bureaucratic 
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procedures over the almost 70 years of his reign. In concluding their biography the 
authors credit Franz Joseph’s efforts ‘to contain local conflicts and to safeguard peace 
in Europe’ (341); but these policies collapsed at Sarajevo. 
For Pieter Judson the basis on which the Empire had survived did not collapse 
in the summer of 1914, but during the following years of military dictatorship. 
Judson’s seminal work adopts an unconventional chronology, covering a period that 
stretches well beyond Metternich’s and Franz Joseph’s lives.22 Starting in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, Judson argues that Maria Theresia’s enlightened 
reforms formed the basis of support for Austrian institutions among peasants of 
different nationalities in many regions of the monarchy, who understood the central 
state as a counterweight to the arbitrary power of their local nobility. His book ends in 
the 1920s, explaining how elements of the Empire’s legal and administrative practice 
survived in the successor states. Throughout his book Judson investigates how various 
social groups experienced and shaped the Empire, and how imperial institutions 
impacted on local life. He understands his book as a challenge to conventional 
approaches that tend to see nationality as the only basis of Habsburg history, showing 
instead how Empire brought different ethnic, religious or linguistic groups together, 
how class or a sense of regional belonging, as well as imperial loyalty, could unite 
people across national boundaries. He emphasises how different religions throughout 
the Empire, in particular Jews, but also Eastern Orthodoxs and Bosnian Muslims, 
‘claimed Francis Joseph as protector’ and ‘lobbied openly for his personal patronage’ 
(235). For Judson, the Habsburg state was ‘an on-going project that engaged the 
minds, hearts, and energies of many of its citizens at every level of society’ (5). 
Unlike many accounts of the Empire, he underlines the monarchy’s tradition of 
recognising legal equality among its citizenry; the role of mandatory primary 
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education in vernacular languages since 1774; the promotion of free trade within large 
parts of the Empire; and, as early as the times of Maria Theresa’s reign, a growing 
sense of state patriotism that further increased during the Napoleonic wars. By 
synthesising many of the achievements of recent Habsburg historiography Judson 
produced a much needed corrective to countless teleological accounts that read what 
we know about 1918 back into the Empire’s earlier past. Instead of taking for granted 
that national diversity caused the Empire’s collapse, Judson argues that the Empire 
actively promoted it and that it stood for its ‘unique ability to create a productive 
unity’ (9). As a consequence, most nationalist movements sought political solutions to 
their quests within the Empire.  
Like Siemann also Judson underlines the role of the Napoleonic Wars in 
fostering feelings of imperial allegiance among the population at large, where the 
creation of a militia (Landwehr) gained particular significance as ‘an interregional all-
Austrian patriotic institution’ (93). Even in Hungary French attempts to raise the 
population against Austrian rule remained fruitless. All over the Empire Napoleon’s 
defeat was celebrated by the local population and contributed to the reputation of 
Francis I as a ‘prince of peace’. Only a decade after its foundation the new state 
seemed thoroughly rooted in its many lands and peoples. Concerning Metternich’s 
years, Judson breaks with some of the myths constructed around his regime, but does 
not go as far as Siemann in presenting us a new image of the statesman. For Judson 
Metternich built a police state that petrified many aspects of Austrian society, but 
concedes that this did not reverse the rule of law established during the years of 
enlightened despotism. Police reports ‘frequently sympathized with local public 
opinion’ and ‘often criticized government policy’ as a way of proposing reforms or 
helping the local populace (132). Compared to Britain and France the size of the 
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Habsburgs’ domestic police force remained rather modest. Noble elites were among 
the most active promoters of science, culture, vernacular languages, as well as of 
public access to education, thus encouraging the flourishing of bourgeois society in 
every corner of the Empire. These efforts notwithstanding, for some vernacular 
languages it took time to meet the semantic demands of educated debate. Hungary’s 
first newspaper was published in Latin, from 1705, followed by a German-language 
paper in 1764. The first newspaper in Hungarian was not published until 1780, 
followed by a Slovak paper in 1783. Many Hungarian periodicals and books 
continued to be in German, including private diaries, memoirs and pamphlets. By 
1847 a total of 191 newspapers appeared regularly, demonstrating that despite 
political repression debate flourished. Louis Kossuth’s Pesti Hirlap then printed 5200 
copies, reaching an estimated 100,000 readers. In Dalmatia and Istria the large 
majority of periodicals until the second half of the nineteenth-century were in Italian. 
The spread of Czech started earlier, with the first newspaper appearing in 1719, soon 
to be followed by bi-lingual papers as well as by Czech translations of German 
papers. If the use of vernacular languages spread, Judson argues, it was mostly the 
consequence of Austria’s efforts to offer all children education in languages they 
spoke at home. The subsequent spread of political movements can be read as a sign of 
virulent discontent, but also of educational policies and the strength of associational 
culture. In the case of Hungary these phenomena explain why, once revolution broke 
out in 1848, opposition against Vienna swiftly produced coherent political 
programmes. Meanwhile, opposition in Hungary merely advocated the rights of the 
so-called historic Hungarian nation, the minority of Magyar speaking elites, without 
considering the rights of peasants and of large sections of the urban population.  
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For the majority of people involved or affected by the Revolution, its aim was 
not to replace the Empire but to reform it. Growing discontent with Vienna did not 
stop large sections of the peasantry to associate the Habsburg state with hopes for 
emancipation from exploitative landlords. For the growing middle classes the Empire 
offered social mobility and a source of patriotic pride. The nobility identified with the 
monarchy’s ancient crownlands that needed the Empire as a structure for a larger 
state. When Ferdinand promised a constitution most citizens linked this development 
to their own participatory vision of Empire, while at the same time creating civic 
guards to contain the revolution. In many parts of the Empire the Revolution quickly 
turned into a celebration of the Emperor and his constitution. Even in some of the 
areas dominated by Italian speaking populations, like Triest, or parts of Tirol and 
Dalmatia, followers of the Revolution were convinced that their territories should 
remain under the Empire. Unlike much of what we think to know about the 
springtime of European peoples, 1848 was more than a revolution against imperial 
oppression. Judson’s long chapter on 1848 offers a self-contained and refreshingly 
new history of the Revolution in the Austrian Empire. 
Judson judges the following period of neo-absolutist bureaucracy harshly, a 
regime that implemented a considerable array of economic and administrative reforms 
by means of a police state. Not entirely convincing, he presents the loss of the Italian 
territories in 1859 and 1866 as the consequence of these failed policies. As a matter of 
fact, Franz Joseph, against the advice of his cabinet and court, had made several 
important steps to reconcile Italians with Habsburg rule.23 The compromise with 
Hungary, reached in 1867, together with the guarantee of constitutional rights in 
Austria, finally stabilised the monarchy, supporting a decade of rapid economic 
growth and infrastructural development in both halves of the Empire. In more detail 
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than most surveys Judson explains the different facets of the complicated 
Compromise with Hungary, as well as the 1868 arrangements between Hungary and 
Croatia, demonstrating how Austria used the settlement to reinforce its status ‘as 
fundamentally multinational’, while Hungary ‘sought to increasingly assimilate ethnic 
non-Hungarians to an ethnic Hungarian identification’ (265). The same issue still 
divides Hungarian politics 150 years on. As a consequence of what Judson describes 
as an ‘ethnic chauvinist policy’ (267), and in order to avoid the election of deputies 
from linguistic minorities, governments in Hungary did their best to avoid reforming 
the franchise. Austria, instead, progressively widened the suffrage after 1867, 
culminating in the introduction of universal manhood suffrage for Parliament in 1907 
and coinciding with the abolition of the curial system of voting. The direct 
comparison is striking, confirming what the Czech historian Jiři Kořalka concluded 
many years ago, that the conditions of any nationality within Cisleithania before 1914 
were certainly much better and more satisfying than those of the minorities anywhere 
else in Europe.24 A fundamental law for Austria proclaimed in 1867 that ‘all national 
groups within the state are equal, and each one has the inviolable right to preserve and 
to cultivate its nationality and language.’ (293) This is not to say that the application 
of such laws was a simple matter or that national communities enjoyed a role as 
political actors in the legal system. One problem was that according to the terms of 
1867, Hungary had the right to overturn any structural reform of the Empire that 
would grant any other lands, such as Galicia or Bohemia, any amount of power 
comparable to that of Hungary. 
Among the most original sections of Judson’s book is the chapter on ‘culture 
wars’, where he questions the assumption that political conflicts in the monarchy were 
the natural consequence of differences between linguistic groups. Taking up 
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arguments made in his book on the Bohemian language border, he shows that ‘people 
often simply ignored nationalist demands for their loyalty’ (271), that nationalism 
dominated some daily life situations but never penetrated other aspects of life in the 
multinational Empire.25 He also reminds readers that the connection between social 
conflict and linguistic diversity worried state-builders in many parts of Europe. For 
Judson, what made Austria different was its imperial practice and the legal tradition 
of its crownlands, which were in themselves multinational. It was on these different 
levels of administration that language issues came to the fore and enjoyed a forum for 
public participation that other European states simply lacked. More importantly, the 
Empire did not oppose identification of its peoples with national cultures; and many 
saw allegiance to their nation as compatible with forms of imperial patriotism. Judson 
reads the Badeni crisis of 1897-98 - the popular reactions against mandating equality 
of the Czech and German languages in Bohemia - not as a sign of failure of Austria’s 
institutions, but of popular involvement in political institutions. While the level of 
political participation triggered by Badeni’s ordinances seems remarkable, and Judson 
rightly argues that in Austria language policies could never be successful if imposed 
from above, for many Czech speakers the crisis ended hopes of full linguistic 
emancipation. Despite this sense of disillusionment, over the following decade 
membership in nationalist organisations actually declined; and the Moravian, Galician 
and Bukovina Compromises demonstrated that solutions to language conflicts were 
possible. But were these Compromises an improvement? In Moravia, for the first 
time, people had to decide whether they wanted to be Czechs or Germans. Registering 
as Moravians, or simply as Austrians, was no longer an option.  
While nationalists fought their cultural battles, liberals and socialists 
challenged conventions in order to transform the Empire according to their vision of 
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modern society. Modernisation meant that increasing numbers of citizens engaged 
with the Empire on a day-to-day basis, indirectly as taxpayers and via educational 
institutions, or as representatives of Empire working as telegraph or railway operators, 
or for the postal services. Also political modernity was lived as an imperial 
experience, for instance when in 1905 Austrians from across the Empire joined 
demonstrations to demand universal manhood suffrage. As a consequence, resentment 
against other national, social or religious groups was rarely articulated in anti-imperial 
terms. Judson confirms what Jakub Beneš has recently demonstrated: that Austrian 
Social Democrats advocated a democratic and federalised Empire as a way to serve 
workers’ as well as national interests.26 Their party was federalised along linguistic 
lines. When in 1911 it gave in to pressure from rival nationalists to split into separate 
parties, it used internationalist ideals to retain collaboration across the new structure. 
The first elections under universal manhood suffrage in 1907 made the Social 
Democrats the largest single party in parliament and ‘showed socialists that the 
Empire was indeed theirs’ (375). During those years Franz Joseph continued to enjoy 
popularity, also among workers.  
Rather than nationality conflicts, for Judson frictions between the military and 
civil society after 1914 played a huge role in the Empire’s demise. The military’s 
assumption of vast dictatorial powers at the start of World War One constituted a 
breaking point in Habsburg history: ending a centennial tradition of rule of law; 
destroying the political role played by the crownland diets; and leading to a situation 
where the imperial bureaucracy had to sign responsible for unpopular wartime 
measures imposed on them by the military command. The military largely ignored the 
overwhelming signs of patriotism among the Empire’s nationalities, submitting 
especially the Slavs to unreasonable levels of suspicion. Sections of the German 
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population responded to this new climate by settling old accounts with the minorities 
through denunciations, further damaging the Empire’s reputation among the 
minorities.27 These conflicts notwithstanding, in 1917 various groups of Slavs still 
submitted programmes for the constitution of autonomous states within a restructured 
Empire. Even then Hungary still opposed any new federal units; and continued to 
resist suffrage reform in its realms. The epilogue to Judson’s book constitutes an 
excellent essay on the problems of nationality in the Empire’s successor states. They 
called themselves nation states – and they were regarded as such by the victorious 
powers – but in practice they were multinational states that treated its non-national 
citizens far worse than the Empire had ever done. The people affected by these 
policies were largely denied a view on matters of their cultural identities. 
For several decades Central European history has been striving, especially in 
the United States. What we learn from the new literature on the Habsburg monarchy 
is that many of the existing descriptions of the Empire, and explanations of its 
disappearance, do not match the lived experience of people in Central Europe. Our 
conventional assessment of the post-Napoleonic period, which reduces Austria’s role 
to a reactionary force of evil, ignores the motivation behind Metternich’s political 
thought, as well as the legacy of enlightened cosmopolitism and of the rule of law in 
much of the region. Neo-absolutist rule under Franz-Joseph went hand-in-hand with 
an impressive push towards social and economic modernisation, while continuing the 
Empire’s remarkable educational ambition. Throughout this period the Empire 
celebrated the diversity of its peoples and promoted its many national cultures, while 
touting the benefits of imperial unity. Liberal and democratic historians have often 
viewed Hungarian nationalism sympathetically, but also after the 1867 Compromise, 
which granted autonomy in almost all matters of policy and administration, it was the 
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Empire’s Hungarian part where democratic advances, and in particular the rights of 
national minorities, remained far behind standards in Cysleithania or elsewhere in 
Europe. Without resorting to counterfactual arguments, all this obliges us to rethink 
the question to what extent the Empire’s multi-nationalism offered a viable alternative 
to the Europe of nation states propagated by the so-called progressive forces of 
history. 
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